EU Restrictive Measures Update — The General Court confirms a broad reach against indirect supporters of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Case T-150/24, 25 February 2026)

On 25 February 2026, the General Court of the European Union (Case T-150/24) confirmed the legality of restrictive measures imposed on AlfaStrakhovanie, one of Russia’s largest insurance undertakings and subsidiary of the Alfa Group. On 18 December 2023, AlfaStrakhovanie had been listed under Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 because it provided indirect material and financial support to the Russian government in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

 The General Court clarifies the contours of Criterion (f), which targets persons and entities providing material or financial support to the Russian government, and to further consolidate its post-2022 sanctions jurisprudence.

A broad interpretation of “material or financial support”

The Council designation of a person or entity under the sanction list must rely on one listing criterion set out in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. AlfaStrakhovanie was designated on the basis of criterion (f), which covers “natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.”

The General Court has confirmed that criterion (f) does not require the existence of a direct link between the conduct relied upon and military operations carried out in Ukraine. It is sufficient that the activities in question objectively benefit state bodies or entities linked to the military effort, or otherwise contribute to the mobilisation or functioning of the resources of the Russian State.

The General Court has thus accepted that the provision of insurance services to the Russian National Guard, the Ministry of Defence, or companies forming part of the military-industrial complex may amount to material or financial support within the meaning of criterion (f). This may be the case even where such services are required under domestic law or correspond to ordinary commercial activities carried out in the course of business.

Thus,  where such activities play a meaningful role in sustaining or enabling state or military structures, they may legitimately be taken into account for the purposes of designation under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.

 

Reliance on indirect and publicly available evidence

The General Court held that the Council may rely on a consistent body of indirect evidence drawn from open sources, including press investigations, corporate disclosures, and publicly accessible procurement or financial data.

It rejected the argument that a listing decision must be based exclusively on prior judicial or administrative findings, emphasising instead that the decisive issue is whether the evidence relied upon, assessed as a whole, is sufficiently precise, reliable, and mutually corroborative. This confirms the existence of a flexible evidentiary threshold, particularly in a context where direct access to information is inherently limited.

Consistently with other judgments delivered in recent years (e.g., Timchenko, Case T-498/22) the EU Courts have reiterated that the factual situation in Russia and Ukraine significantly restricts access to primary sources of information. Therefore, says the General Court, the Council cannot be required to identify or rely systematically on original or first-hand sources, provided that the information used is credible, convergent, and capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn.

 

Proportionality and fundamental rights

In line with settled case law, the General Court reaffirmed that EU restrictive measures are preventive in nature, temporary, and reversible. The resulting interference with fundamental rights, including the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, was considered proportionate in light of the overarching objective of exerting pressure on the Russian Federation to cease its aggression against Ukraine.

The General Court also attached importance to the existence of derogation mechanisms within the sanctions framework. These mechanisms are intended to mitigate the potentially excessive effects of asset-freeze measures and to allow access to frozen assets for essential needs or for specifically authorised purposes.

That said, the proportionality assessment remains contingent on the effective availability of such derogations in practice. Recent experience suggests that derogations are granted sparingly and often subject to restrictive interpretation, particularly where sanctioned entities are concerned. This raises questions as to whether the mitigating function attributed to derogation mechanisms by the EU Courts is fully realised de facto, and whether, in certain cases, the cumulative effects of restrictive measures may extend beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve their preventive objectives.

Conclusion

The AlfaStrakhovanie judgment shows clearly that EU restrictive measures now focuses more on effects than on intentions. By accepting that routine, and even mandatory, commercial services may amount to “material or financial support” when they objectively benefit the Russian state, the General Court lowers the threshold for exposure to listing under criterion (f). The decisive question is no longer whether an operator intended to support the war effort, nor whether its activities are intrinsically military in nature, but whether those activities contribute, even indirectly, to the functioning or resourcing of state structures engaged in the conflict.

This approach undeniably strengthens the preventive and deterrent function of EU restrictive measures. At the same time, it introduces a degree of legal uncertainty for economic operators, particularly in sectors such as insurance, finance, logistics or infrastructure services, where interaction with state-linked counterparties may be unavoidable.

The judgment of Case T-150/24 is available on  : EUR-Lex - 62024TJ0150 - EN - EUR-Lex

For more information, please contact :

Bruno Lebrun – Partner – b.lebrun@janson.be

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